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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATF OF UTAH

DAVID R. II'ILLIAMS, dba
INDUSTRIAL CO}!l\ILJNIC/\TIONS,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

)

)

vs.
HYRUM GIBBONS

& SONS

)
)

CO.,

a Utah corporation,

Defendant-Respondent,
and
NORTH UTAH COMMUNITY T.V.,

a Utah corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.

SUPREME COURT NO. 16,024

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

JOINT BRIEF OF DEFENDANT- INTERVENOR
RESPONDENTS AND CR0SS /\PPHLANTS

NATURE OF THF CASE

The Defendant-Intervenor Respondents (Respondents hereafter)
agree with the

~ppellant's

statement of the Nature of the Case.

DISPOSITION H! L0 1,\TR COURT

The lower Court held that Appellant had the statutory
power of eminent domain, but denied Appellant's right to have
the particulai site in question condemned based on its findings
that:
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"8. This particular site raises the
likelihood that its installation would seriously interfere with the reception of several thousand television sets, which include
television sets within the proposed subdivision
within a distance of one-half mile.
10. The taking of this particular site
is not necessary to the public use of !'let intiff where there are other satisfactorY alterna~ive sites that would meet the same ~onditiuns
and in which the plaintiff would not run any
risk of interference with other public use
facilities."
(F-130)
THE NATPRF

C~F

RELIEF SOlJC;IIT ON i\l'Jll'.'\1.
have the Lower Court's determin-

These Responuerations affirmed on alj

ma-r:ters

with the exception of one and

by way of cross-appeal seek to have this Court reverse the
Lower Court with respect to its Finding t 1u. S to the effect
that the Appellant was authorized as a private company to

exercise the powers of eminent domain and that the use to which
the property sought to be condemned is to be applied by the Appellant, is a use authorized b;· law under conLli t ions precedent to
taking as provided by Section 78-34-4, UCA, 1953, and that
Section 78-34-8 UCA, 1958 (sic)

(78- 34-l(SIJ,

of condemnation to the Appellant.

(l·-12c')

STATEMFNT Or FACTS
l.

The Defendant agrees with the Statcn,r·nt uf Facts as

contained in paragraphs l, 2, and 3 ol Appellant's Brief.
2.

The particular site sought to he condemned by Appel-

lant is located in the middle of a prupusecl rf'sidc,ntial sub
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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division which is on the hillside in the southeast section
of Logan, Utah.

(See Defendant's Exhibit No. 2.)

The Appellant's

expert witness on value testified that the highest and best
use of the property was residential and is legally developable
as residential in Logan City.

(See Transcript, hereinafter

referred to as "T", T. p. 175, lines 20-25.)
3.

The Complaint was filed on April 6, 1976 (See file,

hereinafter referred to as "F," F-1) and the Answer was filed
on April IS, 1976 (1-11) and a Motion for Immediate Occupany
1vas filed on

~lay

20, 1976 (F-13) and the Defendant filed a

Motion For Summary Judgment on

~lay

28, 1976 (1'-23) and on

September 9, 1976, the Court entered an Order (F-57 to 58),
which reads as follows:
"1. That plaintiff operates a common carrier
mobile radio telephone communications business regulated as a public utility which is within the meaning
of "telephone line" in Section 78-34-l (8), Utah Code
Annotated (1953), as Supplemented by Section 54-2-l
(21) Utah Code Annotated (195.)).
2. That Plaintiff has the power of eminent
domain under said statute.
3. That the Court reserves for trial as an
issue of fact whether the particular site to be
condemned is necessary to the public purpose of
plaintiff, and the value of the property."
4.

On September l, 19-(•, IntervC'ncr filed a

Intervene (F-43-44] and on September 28,
granted Intervenor the right to
(F.S9)

int~rvene

1~76

~lotion

to

the Court

in the case.

The Court stated its rC>asoning as follows:
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"One of the issues the Court reserved for
trial was an issue of fact as to whether T!II S

PARTICULAR SITE to be condemned is necessary to
the public purpose of the Plaintiff. Also
implicit in this reservation is as to whether
there are other sites that exists that may serve
the same purpose or whether this particular site
is necessary for the public purpose of the PlainIT££. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to
intervene ... not on the grounds of the proximity
of the movants receiving stations but on the
grounds that they have a valid interest in the
determination of whether this particular site is
necessary for the public purposes of the Plaintiff.
(F. 59)"

5.

At the start vf the trial on May 2, 1978, discussion

between counsel

~~-

The court then statec.

: ·Jrt took place defining the issues.
(T-p. 6, lines 12-18.)

"Now I would assume that they [Fespondcnts] can
show in making a determination of whether this
particular site is necessary for the public purposes of the Plaintiff and also in balancing
the public purposes of the Plaintiff, what it
may do to interfere or disrupt or in other words
other public purposes of which they apparently
serve. I think it goes to the issue of public
purpose."
Through all of the events set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 4 above,
and this Paragraph 5, Appellant made no objection to the court's
proceeding along these lines.
6.

The case was then tried and Fngi necr Boyd Humphreys

testified for Defendants and stated that he has had over 30
years of experience in radio and electronics

111

and that at the present time he is tlw L·hiel

cn~·.cinccr <>i

radio facility at Utah St<~te Universit)'·

(T-~:;o,

\'arious capacities
the

lines l-b)
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Mr. Humphreys stated he had made a study of the proposed transmission site of Plaintiff, (T-230, lines ll-15.) and that a radio
transmitter creates frequency interference caused by overload
due to severe RF--or overload due to close

proximity of transmis-

sion source to the reception devices which

people living in

a residential area normally have in their homes such as TV,
stereo, hi-fi, and tape recorder.
1-6.)

(T-232-233), lines 22-25,

These home receivers are also affected by harmonic radi-

ation.

(T-230-231, lines 25, l-3.)

Mr. Ilumphreys then discussed some of the attendant problems
when TV sets are in a close proximity to a transmission facility
and stated that Appellant's paging frequency falls within the

IF pass band of 44 megacycles of the TV sets. (T.233, lines
19-25 and T.234, lines 1-12, 24-25, T.235, lines l-25, T.236,
lines 1-3.)

That there is nothing a homeowner close enough

to a transmitter can do to block out this interference.
237, lines 1-3, T. 243-244, lines 21-25, 1-13.)

(T-

Mr. Humphreys

stated that he would expect some sort of interference up to
1/2 mile surrounding the transmitter site.
21.)

(T-240, lines 17-

He discusses at length (T-241-243) how this interference

manifests itself within this area.

Mr. Humphreys stated that it

is not necessary to have actual experience with Appellant's equipment and all he needs to know is the power output capacity and
frequency and that will tell him the interference capability.
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(_T-240, lines 1-.3.)

lie stCltcJ that the l·TC is concerned about

these problems, but that it can be very expensive to overcome
them for the ordinary homeowner, (T-24.), lines l-25.)
Mr. Humphreys stated that Logan and Cache Valley are in a
fringe area for TV reception and the TV sets here are much more
susceptible to interference that would manifest itself in Logan
and not manifest itself in Ogden, Salt Lake and Provo areas
because these areas are in a Class A service area.

(T-246-248.)

Mr. Humphreys stated that moving the proposed transmitter site
to the focth1.l .; T':c_·(clllately 1 mile east or the proposed site
and further up the hill would be of no consequence as to the
effectiveness of Appellant's system, and in fact the move of
one mile coupled with a gain in elevation would be compensating for the reduction in field strength.

(T-250, lines 8-12.)

He then testified that he had examined other sites or areas of
Logan for possible transmitter sites for Appellant's proposed
uses, and that in his opinion there were other sites

eas~

and

west of Logan that may yield as good or better fulfillment of
Appellant's system (T-250, lines 13-17, T-252, lines 7-17.)
Mr. Humphreys concluded by stating that he would not consider putting a transmitter facility such as Appellant's in the
middle of a proposed subdivision and that on a scale or 0 to 10
with 0 being the lowest degree of probability, the possibility
that the legal emissions at Appellant's 1 icensed frequency from
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the site proposed by Appellants w.ould interfere with TV sets
within a 1/2 mile radius would be 8 to 10 on said scale.

9T-

256, lines 3-8, T-259 1 line 3.)
7.

The engineers for the Appelant testified that they did

not make any tests to determine site location as it was illegal
to do so under FCC regulations.
153, lines 23-12.)
jective.

(See T-114, line 24 and T-152-

Appellant's site selection was purely sub-

(See T-153, lines 11-22.)

Mr. Williams the owner

of the Appellant testified that they had not explored for
alternative sites (See T-62, lines 18-22.)
8.

Mr. William Fletcher, Associate Professor of Electron-

ics at USU who had been a consultant in the area of interference
and transmission and made detailed studies for site locations
for transmitter and receiver locations then testified for Respondents.

(See T-282, lines 13-23, T-283-284.)

He testified that one

could legally run tests in the valley with a fifty megacycle tranmitter, which could be a great value in site location.
T-289. lines 13-25.)

~lr.

(See

Fletcher then discussed alternative

sites around Logan (See T-289-291.) and he then states that
there is more than one alternative site out there.
lines 10-12.)

~ir.

(See T-291,

Fletcher was then asked as follows:

(T-291, line 21 to 292, line 11.)

"Q If you were to locate a site for a .
transmission facility of up to 500 watt capacrty
would you consider that site in a proposed subdivision area?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A That would be a function of the rrcquency at which I_was transmitting.
J think
I wouldn't mind--1f 1t were two MI-l or scllncthing like that I don't suppose l would feel
too bad about.

Q Let me ask you at 4.3
A

~![!.

I would consider that dangerous.

Q Why do you say that would be dangerous.
A The mere fact that I know what Boyd is
talking about, I have also heard testimony
where when the police operated in that
same band h··
: <•eked out television
signals.
T _,u-•: ,__ ,u-ldn't want to subject
myself to a :aws~~t.
I would move some
place. Now that's purely my own instinct
of self-suvival."
9.

The site sought to be condemned by Appellant is right

next door to the site of the Interventor's head-end receiving
facility for its cable TV system (See Defendant's Exhibit No.
1.)

Mr. Boyd Humpherys was called by 1\!r. Hoggan and questioned

as to possible interference problems between a transmitter
of Appellant's specifications and the cable TV receivers.
Mr. Humphreys stated that channel 6 out

o[

Pocatello comes

to Cache Valley and that to his knowledge the cable TV's receiving
facility is the only one in Utah receiving said station.
T 315, lines 4-13.)

(See

Mr. Humphreys said he would be concerned

about the harmonic energy or spurious emissions that would
cause problems particularly with channel 6 because the second
harmonic energy coming out of Appellant's transmitter at its
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proposed broadcasting

fr~quency

the channel 6 pass band.

would [all directly within

(See T-.315, line 19 to 319, line 17.)

lie said that he would see it as a serious problem.
lines 13 to 14.)

(See T 316,

Mr. Hoggan then asked the following question:

(T 320, line 12.)

"Q Now if I were to ask you to rate the
probability that there would be interference by
the Plaintiff's tranSTilitter with Channel 6 on a
scale of zero to ten, zero being the lowest and
ten the highest, what would you say the probability
would be that the plaintiff's transmitter would
in fact interfere with Channel 6?
~Tr. LLOYD:
Objection.
don't think
there's a sufficient foundation or sufficient
showing of knowledge of his experience with
this ~quipment. He's been talking about
500,000 watts versus the 350 watts.
I just
don't think he's qualified.

"IR. ITOCGAN:
I asked him if it was on
the basis of the examination of the specifications for the plaintiff's equipment.

THE C!lU!l.T:

Overruled.

Q You can answer the question.
A. The probability would be very great.
think the possibility under consideration
I'd have to rate it between eight and ten,
and could not be ignored."
(Sec als" Defendant's J:xhibit :•!o. 6 that illustrates
this testimony.)

l'ir. llumphreys further stated that the only

practical solution to
(T-321,

10.

lin~

~lr.

th~

problems is physical separation

~4.)

~- 1,

1·d a; f c·d 'lr. JTUJnphrers about the FCC solving
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This problem is not resolved by the FCC.

Q Is it your opinion that FCC will allow
them to transmit and interrupt 4,000 homes'
television?
A They can't police individual actions,
individual licensees.
It's up to the licensees;
only when they receive sufficient documentation
showing that there is a difficulty then do they
enter into the case. Fach case is judged on its
c~n merit and each engineering staff should be
able to work those details nut before the situation is completed."
11.

witness as

Attorney Hoggan then called
:t ~~

t'

Interventor's r,

·sten"

(T 331, lines 21 tc:

~illiam

Fletcher as a

the Appellant's transmitter upon

~~r.

Fletcher testified as follows:

2~.)

"If their transmitter goes into or close to
saturation that harmonic content can just jump
back, you know, up to twenty-five per cent. That
could be catastrophic."
He then stated that Appellant's frequency has a first harmonic right in the center of Intervenor's Channel 6.

Mr.

Fletcher then described the effect that the second harmonic
from Appellant's transmitter could have on Channel

6 in Logan

as ranging from bringing just a woobly looking figure to completely
garbled speech and distorted picture.

(T-Y\2, line 10-1.1.)

He then characterized the sir,nal from Channel (, as weak '"hen
received by Intervenor's rPceiver and that such 1·:eakness grcatly
increases the lilelihood of interference as

t~e

Tl 's receivers

pick up the weal< primary signal (Channel (;) and the noise signal
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(second harmonic) and the automatic gain control activates,
(upon reception of weak signals) and sends both into the cable
system without distinction (T-332-333, lines 23-20.)
!'.'hen asked what could be done, the follo\ving was stated:
(T-332, lines 3-4, T-333, lines 21 to 24.)

"Q What would be the surest way of guaranteeing that that kind of interference wouldn't
occur?
A The absolutely surest way, the gut
sure way, is to move away.
(T-334, line 25 to 335, line 12.)

Q You heard the testimony of Mr.
Humphreys as to the degree of probability
rated on scale of from zero to ten, with
zero being the lowest and ten the highest,
that the first harmonic from the plaintiff's
proposed transmitter would interfere with
the plaintiff's (sic (Interveno's) Channel 6
recption at its receiver site. Do you have
an opinion as to the degree of probability
that that interference would occur? Answer
11
yesn or "no."
A Yes, and I would like to qualify that.
Q Okay.
A I have two opinions. If you rate
it on zero to ten as concern, I'd say it's
ten. Okay? From an engineering background I would rate it much like Boyd--"
Mr. Fletcher then stated that with a 350-watt transmitter, one
is dealing with a second harmonic with a significantly greater
signal than is being received on Channel 6 (T-335-336, lines
25-2.)

Finally, when asked if a transmitter could be shielded
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to block out this type of harmonics Professor Fletcher stated
that in his experience there was all kind of trouble in doing
this.

(See T-339, line 4.)
12.

After hearing all of the evidence the Court on May

10, 1978, issued its Memorandum Decision.

(See F-113-115.)

The

Court made a finding:
"· .. that there are several other alternative
sites that would perform the service offered by the
Plaintiff and that the fact that there are other
alternative sites, everything being equal, would
not defeat their right to condemn this particular
site. Pe0~'F? · ~0t normally like to lose their
land througt
Je~.nat1on and to state simply
because the~e ~s annther alternative site, that
then thrusting the burden to some other owner, is
not grounds to sar that the taking is not necessary of this particular site to such use. However, the Court finds, that based upon the testimony, this particular site raises the likelihood
that its installation would seriously interfere
with the reception of several thousand television
sets. That the taking of this particular site
is not necessary to this use where there are other
satisfactory alternative sites that would meet
the same conditions and in which you would
not run any risk of interference with other
public use facilities.
(See F-114-115.)"
13.

The Court then made its Findings of Fact as follows:

(F-130, para. 8-10.)
"8. This particular site raises the
likelihood that its installation would seriously
interfere with the reception of several thousand
television sets, which include television sets
within the proposed subdivision within a distance
of one-half mile.
9. That intervenor owns and operates a
cable ~elevision system in Logan, 1 ltah and
the adJacent communities of North Logan and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
- 12 OCR,
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River Heights; that said cable system is
operated under and by virtue of a Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity issued hy the
Federal Communications Commission and
franchises issued to the Intervenor bv the
said cities of Logan, North Logan and. River
Heights. That Intervenor provides cable TV
services for approximately 4,000 homes and
has invested in its cable system in excess
of $800,00n.oo. The Court finds that the
system operated by Intervenor is and the
services provided by Intervenor are a public
use.
10. The taking of this particular site
is not necessary to the public use of plaintiff
where there are other satisfactory alternative
sites that would meet the same conditions
and in which the plaintiff would not run any
risk of interference with other public use
facilities."
Whereupon, the Court entered its Judgment dismissing this action
for the taking of this particular site.
ARGUMfNT
POINT I. THF LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT TN
HOLDINC: THAT APPELLANT'S lUCHT TO CONfiH!N TI!IS
PARTICULAR SITE SHOULD B[ DENIED BE!AliSF OF THE
LIKF.LIH00D OF SERinU~ INTERFERENCE WTTf' DEFENANT'S AND INTERVENOR'S USE Of THEIR PROPERTY.
Section 78-34-8 lJCA (1953) as amended states the power
of the .Judge in Eminent Domain matters as follows:
"POll'fRS OF COl'RT OR .Jl'DGE--The court or
judge thereof shall have power:
(ll To determine the conditions specified
in Section 78-34-4 UCA (1953) ...
(2) To hear and determine all adverse or
conflicting claims to the property sought to
he condemned and to the damages therefor ... "
Section 78-34-4 provides as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"CONDITIONS PRECI'DENT TO TAKING-- Before
property can be taken it must appear:
(1)
That the use to which it is to be
applied is a use authorized by law;

(2) That the taking is necessary to such
use; and,
(3)
If already appropriated to some
public use, that the public use to which it
is to be applied is a more necessary public use."

The Lower Court held that 1\ppellant was authorized by
l'efend:Jr:t c lai1ns

law to exercise the right of eminent domain .

.1ddress this question hereafter in
Point II.
The Lower Court held that the taking of this particular
site was not necessary for J'laintiff's use when other satisfactory
alternative sites were available that would meet the c;ame conris~

ditions and in which one would not run any
with other public use facilities.

of interference

.A.dclitionally, in a very

real sense, this property has already been appropriated to
some public use inasmuch as the Lower rourt held that the lntcrvenor who provides cable TV to over 4, 000 homes in Logan '' i th
an investment of over $800,000.00 was also a public use as
set forth in 78-34-4(3) \JC\ (1953) and \ppcllant'c; evidcnce
failed to demonstrate that its proposed
pu b 1 i c us e .

liSe

Th e Ap p e l l an t [a i l e cl t " mc c t

is

its

a
lllJ

11!11Il'

r d r_· n n

nec~ss:1ry

r

p r L' o

inasmuch as the great perponderance of the C\'ic!ence in th1s
supports the Court findings.

In making this dccJsiun,

r
ca~c

the
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Court was merely following the statutory mandate of the Legislature
as set forth in 78-34-4 (1) and (2).
As noteu above, judicial detenninati on of the facts in this
particular case is authorized in 78-.\4-4 lJCA wherein it is stated
that the nature of a use within the power of eminent domain is
ultimately a judicial question.
19.)

(See 26 JIJn. Jur. 2d p. 690 FN

The necessity for taking particular land such as in this

case has been held to be a judicial question.
370.)

(See 29 A CJS p.

Appellant, in its brief, cites the recent Utah case of

Salt Lake Co. vs. Ramoselli, 567 P. 2d 182 (Utah, 1977).

In this

case Justice Hall of this Court wrote at page 183 the following:
"1.
The power of eminent duma in is not to
be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and
the courts possess full authority to determine
the proper limits of the power to prevent
abuses in its exercise and litigants should
and do have great latitutde in conferring
dispositive functions upon the court as
they clearly did in this instance.

2. The question of necessity of taking
is the functional PEROGATIVE OF THE JUDICIAL
SYSTHI and that principle of law is stated in
Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows:
'In every case therefore,
there is a judicial question
whether the taking is of such a
nature that it is or may be founded
on public necessity.'
The trial court clearly recognized its duty to
determine the issue o[ necessity and proceeded
to take evidence on that sole issue pursuant
to the stipulation of the parties."
(Emphasis
added.)
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Appellant, in its brief, cites many authorities in support
of its position that are mentioned only in the dissent of Justice
Ellet in the Ramoselli case.

Said citations of ;\ppellant simply

do not reflect the law in the State of Utah as set forth in the
majority opinion in the same case.
The posture of this case was very similar to that of the
Ramoselli case at the time of trial.

Appellant's position, at

this point in time, that the trial court erred in taking evidence
on and

determinin~ th~

acquisition

i~

r,,~

"1

that in a proper case,

issue of the necessity of the proposed
":-lLen.
t~e

Appellant, itself, concedes

Courts may consider whether the par-

ticular taking is necessary and cites the Ramoselli case and
then turns around and quotes Nichols on Eminent Domain from the
dissent in said case, to the effect that generally a Court may
not inquire into the question whether there is any necessity
for the taking or whether there is any need for the particular
estate sought to be condemned.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13.)

The Court's attention is directed to Respondents' statement
of the Facts, Paragraphs 3, 4, and S, supra.

Appellant herein,

is in the same position as the Appellant in the Ramoselli case.
of Appellant's main contentions is that the trial court exceeded
its authority of judicial review, despite the fact that at the
time of trial, it readily recognized the rourt's authority to
determine the issue of necessity of the proposed :1cqui:.;ition.
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One

No objection was interposed by Appellant to the Court's Order
on the

~lotion

for trial.

for Summary Judgment ''herein said issue is reserved

cr- 57)'

or to the Court Is

~lemorandum

Decision allow-

ing the Intervenor standing insofar as said issue is reserved
for trial (F-59) or at the time of trial (T-3, lines 7-21.)
In fact, as in the

Ramosell~

case, the parties herein are to be

viewed as having agreed and stipulated at the time to bifurcate
the trial, separating the issue of entitlement to condemn from that
of just compensation for the taking and reserving the latter issue
for a subsequent hearing.

(T-3, lines, 7-21, T-370, lines 11-

18, a statement by the Trial Court to which no objection was raised
The law is well settled in this state that when a trial
judge has resolved conflicting questions of fact, based on the
evidence and made findings and entered its judgment, all of which
are supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court will not
interfer with the decision.

(See Bountiful vs. Swift, 535 P.

2d 1236 (Utah, 1975); Nuhn vs. Broadbent, 507 P. 2d 371 (Utah
1973);

Olson

vs. Park Daughter, 511 P. 2nd 145 (Utah, 1973);

Ramoselli, supra.)
In Salt Lake Co. vs. Ramoselli, supra, at page 184,
the majority of this court said as follows:
"Plaintiff's challenge to the Judgment
fails since the parties sought and stipulated
for the decision and there is an abundance
of admissible and competent substantial evidence
to suppnrt the same. In accord with the numerous pronouncements of this court, no attempt
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should be made to substitute our Judgment for
that of the trial Court."
From the foregoing it is clear that inasmuch as the trial
Court in this case had substantial evidence upon which to make
its findings and decision, such decision should not he disturbed
by this Court.
The trial court did not err in finding there were several
other alternative sites that would perform the service offered
by Appellants.

The trial court did not err in finding that

this particular

~it

~j~

!

necessary to the public usc of

Appellant given the f nJing as to alternative sites and the
finding relative to the likelihood of interference with Respondents' property.

The evidence adduced at trial was

sharply conflicting.

Appellant's witnesses adamantly insisted

that the particular site involved is the only one that is economically feasible.

Yet both of Appellant's expert witnesses

testified on cross-examination that their selection of this site
was a subjective determination of their part.
21-23, T. 153, lines 13-22.)

cr.

115, lines

Both of Respondents' expert wit-

nesses stated that they felt, after examining the environs around
Logan, that there were other, equally or perhaps more useful
sites available, which would not involve the same dangers of
interference they foresaw as being associated with this site.
(T.250, lines 13-17, T.252, lines 7-17, T.2C1l, lines J0-12.)
Respondents' experts further testified to all the matters set
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR,
18 may
- contain errors.

forth in the Statement of Facts herein,

Paragraphs 6 to 11.

Plaintiff at page 16 of its brief states that there was
no evidence that Appellants' system ever caused--interference-yet, Mr. Williams, owner of the Plaintiff, testified at (T-70,
line 23.) as follows:
"V1e have had two interference problems to
my knowledge in the operation period of our
company."

Appellant claims to have corrected these problems, but
both were in a primary receiving area or a Class-A TV service
area.

In this connection, Boyd Humphreys testified at (T-

247, line 2 to 6.) as follows:
"Those interferring signals may be present
in Salt Lake, although much less amplitude, but,
however, being in the class A service area the
set ignores them. But when your're in a marginal
and fringe area, those problems become very
important."
He went on to say that spurious emissions of Appellant's
equipment that might not manifest themselves in such a Class-A
service area, may well do so in a fringe area such as Cache
Valley.

(T-248, lines 3-19.)

While it is true that neither of Respondents' expert witnesses had experience with Appellant's particular equipment or performec
any tests with it, they were both well-trained men in their field
and trained to anticipate and predict what performance to expect
from certain equipment with specifications that are based upon
and tied to well-known standards.

By the same token, it should
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be recognized that Appellant~ experts admitted never having
performed actual objective tests in Cache Valley, and there is
no evidence that Appellant's equipment would not cause the
interference predicted by Respondents' witnesses in the different
setting of Cache Valley.

Respondents' witnesses would certainly

be the better qualified to testify with respect to this aspect
of the problem and are disinterested third p;11·tie:-; looL ing at the
situation.
Finally, Appellants' own witnesses testified on cross-examination that the Appellac:
distance from seven to
area.

l"

,~,

"t

,nnry transmitter sites varying in

:~cnt~-(1\"

miles from the targeted usc

T1'0 primary sites are seven and :-;eventCl'll n•ilcs from

Vernal, Utah, one is 80 miles from Duchesne, Utah, one is three
to four miles from Coalville, Utah, one is thirteen n1i1es from
Park City, Utah and one is 25 miles fr·om

~·organ,

litah.

('!'.

lines l-4, 12-13, T. 117, lines 9-ll, T. 118, lines 7-10.)

116,
These

are all areas with fewer inhabitants than Cache Valley and wl1ilc
Appellant claims the building structures in at least Park City
are different, (T. 122, lines 13-17), and that much or the service in these areas deals with mobile telephones with outside
antenna, Appellant does admit that they have paging services in
at

least Vernal and in Park City and that the distance from the

proposed site to downto1,11 Logan is approxiJnat;cly a mile to a
mile and a half.

(T. 119 -120, lines 25-2, T.

121, lines l-3,
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-

13-19.)

Given the foregoing, it

see~

evident to Respondents that

the trial court's decision is very well couched in an abundance
of admissible, competent and substantial evidence to support
the same, and this Court should not substitute its judgment
therefor.
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT f'RRF.D D! DETJ:RTHI\T APPr:LLANT, AS A PUBLIC UTILITY, HAD
THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

~HNING

Respondents assert that the trial court erred in allowing
the Appellant, a private public utility, to proceed with eminent
domain.

(F-25 to 27.)

The Constitution of the State o[ lltah, Article I, Section
22, provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.
Section 78-34-1(8) of the UCA provides uses for which
the

~ight

of eminent domain may be exercised as follows:

"A.
Subject to the provisions of this
Chapter the right of eminent domain may be
exercised in behalf of the following public
uses: ... (8) Telegraph, telephone, electric
light and electric power lines, and sites for
electric light and power plants.
(emphasis
added.)
It will be noted that in the provisions of the above
stated Statute, it does not give the right to a private public
utility such as Appellant, with its telephonic services, to
condemn property for the location of transmitter facilities or
"plants," but that there is contained in said Statute speciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fie authority to condemn property for installation of telephone,
telegraph, and electric power lines.

(See 78-34-l (8), supra.)

Nothing therein gives the right to condemn potential sites for
the purpose of radio transmission plants or sites.
The undersigned can find nothing in Section 54-3-l et. seq.
that grants the power of eminent domain to ~my ''public utilities" and therefore the provisions of Section 78-34-l a)Jparently
contain the sole legislative authorization with respect to the
exercise of said po11'C'1

:.1- 1

limiting and restricting

•·

~~·

r{

provisions should be read as

r~~ht

to condemn in behalf of only

those specific public Lses as defined in said statute.
Respondents recognize that perhaps the Legislature could
have authorized and provided the right of eminent domain in
behalf of other public uses not listed in said Section 78-34-l,
but in Utah, the Legislature has not seen fit to do so.

The right

to condemn property as a "site" for a particular activity is
mentioned several times in said section, but not at all for a
telephone or radio transmitter site.

The State Legislature

has granted the right to exercise the power of eminent domain
to private, public utilities companies in cases of telephone
and telegraph lines, not for transmission sites or plants as
noted above.
A second area the Respondents wish to draw to the Court's
attention is addressed in 26 Am.Jur. 2d, page (J68, which pro-
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vides the following:
"The general rule is that the exercise
of the right of eminent domain that private
property can be taken only for a public
purpose or use.
In other words, it is
settled generally that private property
cannot be taken for other than public
use under any circumstances ... Nevertheless,
while the courts have not been in agreement
on the precise meaning of the term "public
use" it has generally been held that the
state does not have power to authorize
the taking of the property of an individual
without his consent for the private use of
another; even on the payment of full
compensation. The modern doctrine is that
a taking for a private use is forbidden
by implication by the constitutional provision especially applicable to eminent
domain; and while implied prohibitions in
the constitutions of the states are not
favored, the rule against taking for
private uses is so firmly established
that it cannot be reasonably subjected to
analysis in the light of mere canons of
construction, and it is now well settled
that the prohibition against taking of
property for public use without just compensation impliedly, but definitely forbids a
taking of property for private uses."
Ttmphas1s added.)
At 26 Am. Jur. 2d page 684 it goes on to state:
"It is a well-settled general principal
that incidental benefits accruing to the
public are not sufficient to make the purpose
of improvement or enterprise a public one.
Thus, where the chief, dominating purpose
or use is private, the mere fact that a
public use or benefit is also incidentally
derived will not warrant the exercise of
eminent domain. The property of an individual
cannot, without his consent, be so devoted
to the private use of another. The controlling
question is whether paramount reason for the
taking of land to which objection is made is
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the public interest, to which_be~efits to
private interests are merely 1nC1dental, or
whether, on the other hand, the pr1vate
interests are paramount and contro11 ing <1JHl
the public interests merely incidental."
At

26 Am. Jur. 2d page 686 it additionally states:
"1\fh.ere there is a combined purpose, partly
for public and partly for private use or benefit,
and the two uses or purposes cannot be separated,
eminent domain cannot be exercised. See footnote
19 c1t1ng numerous cases." (Emphasis added.)
The California case of Bauer vs. Ventura County, 289

P. 2d l

(.Calif.

~c.<

. ."

1:1c'~

public use as follows:

"Public usc- "itlnn the constitutiunZil provi·
sian that private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensa·
tion is a use concerning the whole community and
legitimate objective of government."
In connection with Section 78-.34-1 (8) and 54-2·1 et. sel[.
there is no specific mention by the Legislature that radiotelephone common carriers, or other business regulated by the
Public Service Commission have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain.
It seems to the Pespondents that the primary purpose of
the definitions of "telephone line"

and "telephone corporation,"

as set forth in the Public Utilities sections or 54·2·1 l2l) all<!
54 . 2 - l

( 2 2) '

uc~ '

i s t

0

a i d i n s 8 tt i n g

r () r t

h t h '·' I' a I" a Jill' t e r s \;' i t h i 11

1
ll

hich the regulatory statute set forth therein

ts

tn operate in ]Ho·

viding a means lvhereb;· the .'itZite, throui:h the> f'uhlic- Son·icc>
Conunission, can regulate tlwse that arc in the

hthlllC'SS,

inter
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alia, of providing telephonic communications to the general
public by the use of telephone.
The case of r1innesota

~:icrowave

Jnc. vs. Puhlic Service

Con®ission, 190 NK 2d 661, 665 and 666, 291 Minnesota 241,
is a case where a private company provided, under contract,
unidirectional closed circuit microwave facilities for
transmission of educational television signals involving
no use of telephone poles, lines or equipment for transmission furnished from point to point, although the suhscriber would have to use coaxial cables not owned nor
supplied by the company to convey material transmitted
to and from the terminals of the company system.

It was

held not to be a telephone company or supplier of a telephone
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission.
Section 54-3-8 is a provision stating there will be
no discrimination in rates of a public utility.

Section

54-3-10 provides that the service of a telephone corporation
will be given on a non-discrimination basis; and Section
54-4-1 is not applicable and docs not give the right of condemnation to the Appellant, hut merely vests jurisdiction
in the Public Service Commission to supervise and regulate
the public utilities within the State.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain in the taking
of a private person's property is a very severe and drastic
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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remedy, and is strictly 1 imited to those areas that are specifically set forth in the I:minent llomain Statute.

This has

not been followed in this case and unless the Appellant is
clearly authorized by Statute to proceed as it desires, this
Court should find in favor of the Respondents and reverse the
trial count's determination that the Appellant has the authority,
as a public utility, to exercise the power of eminent domain in
corudemning this particular site for its radio-telephone transmitter-receiYc'

'~

ilities.

PC1l~1T '~ I . fl 't LO\\T R COURT CORRJ:CTL Y
FOUND THE InTR\'E':ciJ;. Tl' HAVE STANDINC: TO
CONTEST THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT.
.1

The purpose of the legal doctrine of intervention and the
rationale behind it have been clearly stated in legal treatises
and in courts across the country.
In 59 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 552-3 it states:
"The purpose of the procedure is to enable
anyone having an interest in a subject of litigation to interject himself into the case in
timely season to protect his rights and to
obviate delay and multiplicity of actions.
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process."

(Emphasis added)

In People vs. Superior Court of Ventura County, 552 P. 2d
760 (Calif., 1976) the Court said:
"The intervention statute protects the
interests of others affected by the judgment,
obviating delay and multiplicity.
In City of Delta vs. Thompson, 548 P. Zd 1292 (Colo.,
197 S), the Court said:
"Rules as to right to intervene as a party
in an action are to be liberally construed so
that all related controversies may be settled
in one action.
In Utah, there are apparently two statutes to be considered
with respect to the present action.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure deals speci(ically with intervention by parties
in civil actions.

Rule 24 provides as follows:

"(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(3) when the applicant is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to
the control or disposition of the court or
an officer thereof.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon
timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: ... (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in
common ... In exercisiong its discretion the
Court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
Even without a liberal construction of the foregoing rule
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as it should be applied in the present case, the IntervenorRespondent clearly falls within subsections "a (3)" and "b (2)"
of Rule 24.

The evidence set forth above clearly shows that

the Intervenor-Respondent stands to be adversely affected in a
very direct manner were the trial court or this court to dispose
of the property subject to their control in favor of Appellant.
By the same token, the same evidence clearly shows that both
Respondents have questions of fact in conm1on between them.

The

bulk of testimony given on behalf of both respondents was given
by the same two witnesses and was to the effect that the taking
of the particular site requested by Appellant is not necessary
to its public use because there are other equally or more suitable sites available and that both Respondents face the serious
likelihood of direct interference with the highest and best use
of their property.

Certainly delay and a multiplicity of actions

in the most appropriate and correct sense have been avoided by
allowing Intervenor-Respondent to enter the defense of this action,
such intervention has not unduly delayed or prejudiced the adjudication of the rights or the original parties.
The second statute to be dealt with is found at 78-34-7,
UCA.

It states:

"Who mat appear and defend. All persons 1n
occupation o , or having or claiming an interest
in, any of the property described in the complaint,
or in the damages for the taking thereor, though
not named, may appear, plead and defend, each in
respect to his own property or interest, or that
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claimed oy him, in the same manner as if named in
the complaint.
It does not appear to Respondents that this is to be read
as as e.xclusive statement of the rights of parties to appear
and defend in condemnation actions, but in [act, must be read
in conjunction with Rule 24,

Respondents see nothing unique in

condemnation actions to remove them from the main stream of
intervention in civil cases, especially in light of the laudable
and necessary bases for the doctrine.
The Appellant correctly points out that the IntervenorRespondent has no interest in the property at issue here in
a fee simple sense.

It cites two cases in support of its claim

that in light of that fact, Intervenor-Respondent has no standing.
In State vs. Tedesco, 286 P. 2d 785 (Utah, 1955), the facts are
different than those of the present case and result in meaningful
distinctions.

The Appellant in that case was defending against

and appealing an action by the State of Utah itself, which had
raised the defense of sovereign immunity.
herein.

Such is not the case

The Appellant in that case, after a rejection of his

claim, could still proceed to fully use its land without the concerr
of a material and continuing interference with such use by
the condemnor.

Such 1s not the case here.

facts in that case, the

Contrary to the

facts here show that the Interveno~

Respondent has a present, direct and real interest in the land
sought to be condemned by the Appellant.
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It should be noted that the trial court Lound in its
MeJJwrandum Decision allowing intervention that the mot ion should
be granted:
'' ... on the grounds that they have a valid
interest in the determination of whether this
particular site is necessary for the publ~pur
poses of the Plaintiff."(J-59)
In the second case cited by Appellant, City of Louisville
vs. Munro, 475 S.W. Zd 479 (Ky. 1971), the Appellant's own statement of the case conto1ns the exception applicable to this case.
A claim for damages

~·

ulJ not be established in the absence of

a showing of material interference with

t~e

ordinary physical

comfort or reasonable use of the complaining neighbor's property.
Such a material interference is precisely what IntervenorRespondent alleged and proved to the satisLactinn of the trial
court as being the result of granting Appellant's request.
In concluding this argument, it should be noted that
Appellant raised an objection to the intervention of the cable
television company by way of a Memorandum opposing such action
filed with the trial court on September 7, 1976.

That is the

(F-53)

last mention of any objection to Intervenor's presence until
Appellant's Brief was filed with this court over two years later.
Appellant's trial llemorandum does not renew the objection and
in fact discusses Intervenor's defense in depth.

(T-108)

/\t

the trial proper, the question h·as raised as to the issues
being tried and the reasons for Intervenor's presence.

(T.
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2, line 7.)

At no time did Appellant renew its objection.

In light of all that has transpired since May 11, 1976,
and in any event, Respondents submit that Appellants should
be found to have waived any objection they may have to Intervenor's participation in this lawsuit and be estopped from
now raising it.
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT IS MORE THAI\/ LIKFLY THAT THE
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WILL SUFITR GPEAT AND
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF THE TRANSMITTER 0F
APPELLfu\IT IS INSTALLED ~~ITHIN THE MIDDLE OF
ITS PROPOSED SUBDIVISION.
Answering Point III of Appellant's brief, Resondents
assert that it is clear from the evidence set forth above that
the Respondents face a very high probability that they will
suffer great and irreparable damage if the transmitter of Appellant were installed within the middle of the Defendant-Respondent's
proposed subdivision and immediately adjacent to IntervenorRespondent's cable TV receivers.

Appellants own expert on

the value of the property testified that the highest and best
use thereof is residential and is legally developable in Logan
City.

(T.

175, lines 20-ZS.)

l''r. Lloyd on cross examination

asked Mr. Humphreys the following:

(T 272, lines 10 - 22.)

"(I
Rut in fact it's conunon knowledge
in your business, is it not, that two-way
radio for business license similar to Mr.
Wilcox or CB operators do omit harmonics
and spurious emissions that cause problems
all over the country.
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A

So do paging transmitters.

Q Oh, do you know a single instance
of a paging transmitter creating a problem
other than the one Nr. Williams Jescr1beJ?
A I must go by your specifications.
You are required to meet a minus sixty-five
DB in harmonic attenuation, and that's the
limit according to specifications. riti:ens
hand tranSTIJi tters must n1eet the same thing."
Further, it is evident from the testimony of the Respondents'
experts that there is a serious question about Appellant's contention that this is t!1c -T:·c :In•i only site in Cache Valley.

The

Court made such a determination under it's statutory mandate in
Section 78-34-4 (2) and 78-.34-8 (l), UCA.

Appellant claims that

the testimony of Respondents' experts was mere speculation, and
yet these experts have vast experience

in the area of radio and

electronic emissions and radiation from the sume.
230, lines 14-9, T 282-283.)

(See T 229-

The fact that these experts have

not worked with this particular brand of equipment does not alter
the electronic principles or effects.

Appellant completely

ignores the fact that Cache Valley is in fringe area fur 1V
reception where interference can be much more or the problem
than in the Salt Lake City, Ogden and Pro\'ll areas, which arc
class-A reception areas.

All testimony or i\ppellant

as to its assurances that there lHJuld be no interference, at
least no interference they couldn't correct, was pure speculation
inasmuch as they have hac.! no experience with their equipment in
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the very different environment of Cache County.
The Court, at this point

1

his respectfully referred to

Respondents' Point I, supra, for the argument contained there
as it goes to this particular issue as well.
POINT V. THE FEDERAL cmH.l!lNICATJONS (OH!!ISSION
REGULATLS '!'FIE ASSIGNING OF RADIO FREQUHICIES, LICENSES AND CQ}Il'lON CARRIERS AND PERFORI,!S THE Ft'NCTim!S
ASSIGNED TO IT BY CONGRESS.
These Respondents acknowledge that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC hereafter) regulates the assigning of radio
frequencies, licenses common carriers, and performs the functions
assigned to it by Congress, i.e.:
" ... to make available so far as possible
to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ... "
(See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC 151.)

This

includes, of course, a duty to monitor and allocate among the variou
states, and cities and counties thereof, the use of the airwaves
pursuant to the broad mandate set forth above.
Based upon an examination of said act, the references
thereto in legal treatises and the federal cases cited by AppelJant in its brief, these Respondents are unable to find any
references to the effect that the

rcc

is to be involved exclusively

in the approval or disapproval of base station site locations,
or that the J'CC: is to be involved at all.

A reading of Section

319 (a) or said Act relating to construction permits and licenses
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for operation appears to indicate that it is the responsibility
of the individual licensee to obtain a site and then notify
the FCC of its location u.nd
for a construction permit.

ownership as a part o[ the applic::~tion
Additionally, respondent' could

not find any law to the effect that the FCC is concerned with,
regulates or investigates complaints of the type to be expected
from residents who e2::perience the interference

with their

television sets foreseen by Respondents' experts, caused by
the operation c'

~'-

site and within 2n

~ppraximate

This

_ L1Ilt 's transmitters on the proposed
area of one-half mile therefrom.

was a further basis of the

trial courts decision and a

point not addressed by Appellant in Point IV of its brief.
With respect to Appellant's claim that the FCC, exclusively,
approves or disapproves base station site locations;

Respondents

submit that Appellant has excised certain broad statements
from the cases cited in Point IV o[ its brief and attempted
to extend their coveru.ge and import for beyond that intended
by the courts.

It would be impractical and very burdensome

if the FCC's involvement in local base station site locu.tions,
except on rare occasion, were to extend beyond approving their
general geographic location by state, county, or even city.
None of the authorities cited by Appellant specifically deal with
this problem, and it is not legally or practically sound to
extend the isolated statements by the Courts, considering
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the tremendous impact OJ so doing to the point of saying that
the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction in approving the exact location of each transmitting base station.

To do so would be to

declare Section 78-34-8, UCA invalid insofar as it relates to
all cases OJ this type.

It appears to Respondents that much

more is needed by way of legal authority before this Court should
feel compelled to take such a step.

Further, Appellant's state-

ments as to the exclusivity of the FCC's role in selecting site
locations are undercut by Appellant's own acts in going to the
Utah Public Service Commission for a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity in order to locate and operate in the Cache County
area.

Then, on page 27 of its brief, near the bottom, Appellant

seems to say that such deterreinations are exclusively the domain
of the FCC or the Utah Public Services Commission.

Such a state-

ment is not reconcilable with Appellant's earlier statements.
The fact is that state and federal authorities must work hand
in hand each operating in their own particular sphere of authority,
in order to produce a workable regulation system for airwaves
over our country.
The trial court is charged by law, as set forth in previous
arguments herein, to determine the conditions precedent to allowing Appellant to exercise the power of eminant domain.

It in

no way interfered with the mandate given to the FCC to regulate
the use of the airwaves, to allow the trial court to carry out
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its said duty.

The trial court dealt with frequencies and

interferences only insofar as was necessary to determine if the
taking of this particular site was necessary to Appellant's proposed use.

The trial court did not order Appellant to use a

new frequency nor deny Appellant the right to operate in the proposed service area.
was

It merely determined that the proposed taking

not necessary, based upon evidence equally or more competent

than Appellant 1 s.
may have had no

Cln the one hand, Respondents' 1vi tnesses

experi~nce

but had many years

with Appellant's specific equipment,

eyo~r.c~c2

in dealing with the principles

upon which the equipment operates.

On the other hand, Appellant's

equipment is no where located next to a television receiver
receiving and

transmitting Channel 6 from Pocatello, Idaho

Appellant's witnesses had no experience in dealing with their
equipment in the specific environs of Cache Valley, a fringe
television receiption area at best, Appellant's witnesses adwitted.
they had performed no actual and legal tests whatsoever in Cache
Valley which Respondents' witnesses said they would and should
have, and said witnesses both admitted that their selection o[
this particular site was purely subjective.
Respondents readily concede that the trial judge was not an
expert in the fields or radio and televisi()n electronics :1nd
communications.

Respondents submit, however, that the case

reporters are replete with cases in which the trial j ml~:e or
other fact finder must be educated bv the p~11'ty~' 1v1 tncsscs,
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who are experts in the subject matter of the lawsuits, before a
decision can be reached.

T~e

process of receiving the evidence,

digesting it, weighing it and finally making a determination is
often long and difficult, but because such is the case is no
reason to remove the decision from the proper and legally constituted finder of fact.
Finally, Appellant raises for the first time, on appeal,
these

specific allegations of error to the effect that the

trial court erred in receiving evidence as to the necessity
Appellant has for this site and ruling that other sites were
available, and to the effect that the

~CC

is the exclusive

agency for determining local base site locations.
pointed out, Appellant has readily

As previously

agreed that the necessity

of this particular site as opposed to alternatives was the
very issue the court was to decide.

(See Point I above.)

Appellant should not now be allowed to

raise the issue after

it was decided adversely to its interests.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant under Utah
law had the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in the
manner attempted.

This court should so hold until the legis-

lature grants specific authority to condemn for the particular
purpose Appellant has stated it requires the property.
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its said duty.

The trial court dealt wlth frequencies and

interferences only insofar as was necessary to determine if the
taking of this particular site was necessary to Appellant's proposed use.

The trial court did not order Appellant to use a

new frequency nor deny Appellant the right to operate in the proIt merely determined that the proposed taking

posed service area.
was

not necessary, based upon evidence equally or more competent

than Appellant 1 s.

(In the one hand, Respondents

1

witnesses

may have had no experience with Appellant's specific equipment,
but had many years experience in dealing with the principles
upon which the equipJ.

-r:~ates.

Cln the other hand, Appellant's

equipment is no where located next to a television receiver
receiving and

transmitting Channel 6 from Pocatello, Idaho

Appellant's witnesses had no experience 1n dealing with their
equipment in the specific environs of Cache \'alley, a fringe
television receiption area at best, Appellant's witnesses

ad~itted.

they had performed no actual and legal tests whatsoever in Cache
Valley which Respondents' witnesses said they would and should
have, and said witnesses both admitted that their selection of
this particular site was purely subjective.
Respondents readily concede that the trial judge was not an
expert in the fields o[ radio and television
communications.

electronic~

and

Respondents submit, however, that the case

reporters are replete with cases in which the triil1 jud;;e or
other fact finder must be educated bv the pilrtvs'

witnessc~,
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who are experts in the subject matter of the lawsuits, before a
decision can be reached.

The process of receiving the evidence,

digesting it, weighing it and finally making a determination is
often long and difficult, but because such is the case is no
reason to remove the decision from the proper and legally constituted finder of fact.
finally, Appellant raises for the first time, on appeal,
these

specific allegations of error to the effect that the

trial court erred in receiving evidence as to the necessity
Appellant has for this site and

rulin~

that other sites were

rcc

availilble, and to the effect that the

is the exclusive

agency for determining local base site locations.
pointed out, Appellant has readily

As previously

agreed that the necessity

of this particular site as opposed to alternatives was the
very issue the court was to decide.

(See Point I above.)

. Appellant should not now be allowed to

raise the issue after

it was decided adversely to its interests.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant under Utah
law had the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in the
manner attempted.

This court should so hold until the legis-

lature grants specific authority to condemn for the particular
purpose Appellant tas stated it

r~quires

the property.
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The trial covrt \vas correct, ho~Vevcr,

in detennintn:• that

Appellant's right to condemn this particular site slwuld he
denied because of the serious likL·l llwod tltat 1\ppcllatlt 's transmitters will

interfere with

the Repondents' use of their

property and 1vould very likely cause Respondents great

~1nLl

irreparable damage if

inst<~lleJ

court was correct in

determining that several other :llternative

where requested;

The trial

sites would perform the same service for ,\ppellant and th:1.t
the Intervenor-Respondent
of this law suir

'-~

hacl standing to enter the del"ensc

t:rial court was also correct in receiving

evidence anci detcl·n:',,t,,:• the S]Jecific issues hcC(JtC
as it was legisla t i v•'ly

m~1ncla

1t

tJtastnuch

ted tu do su.

clearly supports the decision made by the trial court with
respect to the points just listed and was coi·rcct

in entering

a Judgment dismissing Appellant's Cun;pla 1nt.
Di\TFD this 12th clay o [ February, l

~179.
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